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CROATIAN STABILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY IN THE 1990s
This study deals with the purpose and the different forms of programme 
arrangements with international fi nancial institutions. It deals with the prin-
ciples and the meaning of the so-called fi nancial programmes providing an 
analysis of the results of their general application, and especially with the role 
of the IMF and the World Bank in establishing Croatian economic policy. The 
fi nal outcome of the study is a review and an assessment of the current state 
and future prospects of the Croatian economy as the long-term development 
implications of the structural adjustment policy that has been stipulated by 
the national government in coordination with the IMF and the WB.
 It is possible to outline a national development strategy based on the 
results of this analysis:
The strategy could be a stage approach to development : in the fi rst 
stage higher monetary sovereignty is necessary , and an export stimulating 
exchange rate; by means of an exchange rate policy and developmentally 
acceptable interest rates, consumption would in the beginning be restricted 
and then redirected towards domestic products; in that way export competi-
tiveness would be supported by relative prices rules in accordance with the 
global productivity of the economy ; a development programme of an exclu-
sively microeconomic orientation stipulated by the World Bank doctrine is 
not complete, and in certain segments it is one-sided and premature for the 
development moment of the Croatian economy;  the stage of stability when 
short-term and long-term capital is prone to infl ow into the country will be a 
sign of beginning a mature stage of recovery and developmnet ; in that stage 
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the market mechanism will regulate development-stimulating interest rate; 
this stage presumes a developed institutional infrastructure and developed 
mechanisms of the country’s fi nancial system.
The kuna appreciation policy i.e. the policy of stability on a misaligned 
level of the kuna in the state of underemployment equilibrium, contradicts 
the industrialization of the country and imply an excessive tertiarization of 
the economic structure, which endangers the future external equilibrium, but 
also the optimal economic and employment structure .
From these theories it can be concluded that the monetary policy, 
especially the exchange rate and fi scal policies, in its macroeconomic and 
microeconomic aspects, should be coordinated with the recovery and deve-
lopment policy and with the policy of stabilization and banking and foreign 
trade system liberalization.
Key words: stabilization policy; restructuring; balance-of-payments 
current account defi cit; currency exchange rate; fi nancial programme; net 
domestic assets of the Croatian National Bank and the banking system; ap-
preciation; depreciation; competitiveness of the economy; economic recovery 
and growth.
• Note: This paper was written in 1997 as a part of the study “Globalization 
and the Liberalization of the Croatian Financial System and Economic 
Development” by the Institute of Economics Zagreb, and has not until now 
been formally published. Since this paper gives quite a precise outline of 
the roots of our current development and debt uncertainty, it could be useful 
in understanding the principles of Croatian macroeconomic policy and its 
consequences. The text as a whole is entirely current so that the readers 
might only at certain points notice that this is an analysis of six years ago. 
It illustrates, in its own way, the Croatian low “time propulsion” of under-
standing its own economic and social processes.
Introduction. The Croatian development strategy has still not been specifi ed 
in any formal document adopted by the Parliament. The elements of this strategy, 
however, are quite clearly shown in the arrangements of the Croatian Government 
and the Croatian National Bank with the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. The Parliament deals with this strategy in cases of debating and adopting 
“systemic laws” and the budget that approve or regulate loan arrangements of the 
government and the world fi nancial institutions, providing collaterals to external 
loans for fi nancing infrastructure programmes as well as some specifi c companies 
in other sectors of the economy. Some important elements of the long-term deve-
lopment strategy are contained in the institutional restructuring legislation, such as 
the laws on privatization, banking, accountancy, foreign trade system, the Central 
Bank, the tax and pension insurance systems, the labour and capital markets. 
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So the arrangements with the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank are the subject of parliamentary discussions only in the process of accepting 
external loans which need to pass through the parliament. The Government and 
the Croatian National Bank are obliged to ask for approval from the Parliament for 
any international loan arrangement. The IMF prefers this method of dealing with 
their arrangements. However, the IMF and the World Bank do not take explicit 
responsibility for the effi ciency and the success of the realization of the aims de-
termined by such arrangements. The risk of success is on the client country, while 
the Bretton-Woods institutions play a “catalyst” role in the reform and stabilization 
processes, without a special quantitatively determined development goal, which 
is the usual starting point of national development strategies. Under these circum-
stances, which are determined by the lack of a development strategy formulated 
by the Parliament and where institutional (and legal) restructuring is a long-term 
process, the research on development issues and economic recovery should start by 
studying the role of the world fi nancial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, 
in creating Croatian economic policy. Such an approach enables a concrete insight 
into and understanding of Croatian development policy but also helps in forming 
an opinion about it.
So this study deals with the purpose and the different forms of programme 
arrangements with international fi nancial institutions. It deals with the principles 
and the meaning of the so-called fi nancial programmes providing an analysis of 
the results of their general application, and especially with the role of the IMF and 
the World Bank in establishing Croatian economic policy. The fi nal outcome of 
the study is a review and an assessment of the current state and future prospects of 
the Croatian economy as the long-term development implications of the structural 
adjustment policy that has been stipulated by the national government in coordi-
nation with the IMF and the WB. 
The Purpose And Forms Of The International Monetary Fund 
Programme Arrangements With Countries Experiencing 
Stabilization And Development Diffi culties 
According to Guitian1, during the last several decades the general aim of the 
International Monetary Fund programme has been to establish a sustainable equili-
brium of the balance of international payments of countries with external liquidity 
problems. Hereby the notion of the balance-of-payments sustainability for many 
developing countries means “a balance-of-payments current account defi cit that 
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5 See:  /  2, p. 1-3  /  .
can be fi nanced, on a sustainable basis, by net capital infl ow which is compatible 
with the growth and development perspectives of the country “.
In 1988 an operational directive was specifi ed, and it defi nes the limit of the 
balance-of-payments current account defi cit. This is the level that can be fi nanced 
by capital infl ow “which in the future will not put into question the external debt 
servicing of the country”. This is the purpose of stimulating the creation of foreign 
exchange reserves with the aim of protection against unfavourable events, in order 
to secure the ability to repay the loan granted to the country by the Fund.2
Eventually the programmes expand in the direction of achieving sustainable 
balance-of-payments equilibrium in the conditions of an open and liberalised foreign 
trade and payment system. Economic growth, too, gradually becomes an element 
of an “objective function” and criteria supported by the arrangements. The mem-
ber countries of the Group of Twenty-Four suggest to the IMF an elaboration of 
development scenarios of a country before accepting and determining the fi nancial 
programme. Development scenarios should be the basis for determining external 
sources necessary for fi nancing the growth. A fi nancial programme should precisely 
determine the necessary funds of supplementary external fi nancing.3 Including gro-
wth criteria into programme goals expands the so-called “conditionality” criteria 
of the programme, from the common policy of domestic demand restrictions in 
order to achieve a short-term equilibrium of the balance of payments, to the supply 
side policy which deregulates the repressive economic and especially the fi nan-
cial system. The conditionality has insisted on “open economic policy” aiming to 
increase international competition in order to improve the effi ciency of economic 
growth. This is the reason for establishing longer (three-year period) arrangements, 
alongside the earlier year-and-a-half periods.  The main goal of medium-term fi -
nancial and development programmes is to achieve long-term balance-of-payments 
sustainability.4
The expansion of the programme’s aims includes different kinds and subjects 
of arrangements: 
• Stand by arrangements cover a period from one to two years, and are based 
upon a conditioned macroeconomic policy, such as fi scal, monetary and 
currency exchange rate policy, the aim always being to overcome current 
defi cits and other diffi culties in the balance of payments.5 The instruments 
of such policies are the “performance criteria” given by the fi nancial pro-
gramme. Performance criteria are usually in the form of restrictions of 
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6 This is  J.J.  Polak’s model, upon which the IMF methodology of fi nancial programmes is 
based. See:  /  4  /  and  /  5  / . In the latest arrangement in Croatia the performance criteria were the 
net assets of the central bank but the surrender of foreign exchange was not compulsory! 
credit increases of the banking system as a whole, restrictions of budgetary 
expenditures, demands for increasing foreign exchange reserves and limi-
ting the increase of the public debt (external and internal). Applying these 
instruments is a condition for using the IMF loans, in installments during 
the arrangement; the loan repayment usually has a grace period, and  is 
repaid in three to fi ve years; 
• Extended Fund Facility (EFF) provides the fi nancial support of the Fund 
for a period of three to four years with the aim of overcoming balance of 
payments defi cits caused by the macroeconomic and structural problems 
of the country. Such arrangements distinctly require the implementation of 
specifi c structural adjustment policies, such as liberalization of the fi nancial 
and foreign trade system. The fi nancial means (loans) are conditioned by the 
application of the “performance criteria”, similar to a stand-by arrangement. 
The withdrawal of the loan goes on in stages, after a favourable report on 
fulfi llment of the “performance criteria”.
Extended fi nancial arrangements, according to the required supply side policy, 
are very close to the conditionality requirements for structural adjustment loans of 
the World Bank. Such arrangements are often, especially in the last several years, 
linked arrangements of both institutions, and are even mutually conditioned.
Loans of both institutions, in fact, do not represent a particularly abundant 
fi nancial support so such arrangements are often justifi ed by their “catalyst” fun-
ction. If they are successful they represent a guarantee for private capital that the 
country is conducting an appropriate stabilization policy and that the macroeco-
nomic environment is favourable for the entry of foreign fi nancial capital and for 
foreign direct investments. This basically means that the fi nancial credibility of a 
country, considering the ability to repay both public and private loans, is granted 
by the sustainable current and capital balance of payments.
Financial Programme, Its Results And Neoliberalism
(1) In its simple form, a fi nancial programme is based on a “monetary appro-
ach” to the country’s balance of payments policy.6 A fi nancial programme model, 
by means of a simple equation, links the following: monetary aggregates in a broad 
sense (M3 i.e. M4 when considering the banking system as a whole) equals net ex-
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ternal assets of the banking system plus net domestic assets of the banking system. 
Net external assets of the banking system can be reduced to net external assets of 
the central bank in the conditions of a compulsory surrender (cession) of commer-
cial banks’ foreign exchange funds. The interrelation of the mentioned aggregates 
is defi ned so that the increase of money demand “in a broad sense”, that is equal 
to the increase of supply of money, is equal to the sum of the net domestic assets 
increase (loans given by the banking system) and the net external assets increase 
of the banking system. This model can be shown in various forms, according to 
the purpose of the analysis and the statistical possibilities. 
The effi ciency of the limits set in terms of increase of the mentioned aggregates 
depends considerably on the current condition in absolute values, especially as far 
as the real money demand, as a function of national income, is concerned. 
In the Keynesian sense, this model can show in an appropriate way the sur-
plus of domestic absorption over income, which becomes a balance-of-payments 
defi cit, and which is closely connected with the domestic credit expansion surplus. 
In the IMF’s interpretation, the domestic credit expansion surplus (and basically 
the defi cit fi nancing of public consumption) is pointed out as the basic cause of a 
country’s balance of payments destabilization. In this context the importance of 
currency exchange rate for the sustainable equilibrium of the balance of payments 
stands out.7
In order to achieve the equilibrium of the balance-of-payments current account 
and price stability, it is of vital importance to abide by the following performance 
criteria, i.e. nominal anchors8 given in the following form:
• in the function of disinfl ation a fi xed nominal currency exchange rate is 
appropriate; equally, “there is no better alternative” in order to change 
relative prices to promote the competitiveness of the export sectors of the 
economy than adjusting the exchange rate of the currency9; the development 
structural effect of the real currency exchange rate is important; in the case 
that the currency exchange rate is the anchor of the programme, wage and 
price control are in the beginning often taken as supplementary anchors;
• usually, the central part of the programme is demand limitation by reducing 
(relatively and absolutely) public consumption i.e. the  budget defi cit; this is 
achieved especially by limiting state and broader public consumption using 
credit restrictions in the banking system, and the central bank in particular; 
S. ZDUNIĆ: Croatian Stabilization and Development Policy in the 1990s
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (3-4) 256-301 (2004)262
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the relationship between the restriction of defi cit fi nancing as performance 
criteria and credit expansion ceiling is very close;
• the role of exogenously determined credit expansion as a nominal anchor 
is connected with the required increase of foreign exchange reserves of the 
central bank; this requirement is given in the form of the lower limit of the 
periodic cumulative growth  of foreign exchange reserves;
• generating cumulative periodic foreign exchange reserves by increasing 
the net foreign exchange assets of the central bank, as the performance 
criteria, supports external liquidity and the credibility of a country, and 
grants the ability to repay external loans; this is considered to be the basic 
aim of a fi nancial programme, whose basic instrument is limiting the gro-
wth of domestic loans above the growth of the money supply in a broader 
sense.10 Accordingly, if the target variable is the increase of external net 
assets (foreign exchange reserves), with the given expected increase of the 
national income as a variable which defi nes the money demand in a broader 
sense (the income variable is in fact given exogenously by projection),11 
then the instrumental variable, defi ned by the central bank, is the increase 
of the domestic net assets of the banking system. In other words, exoge-
nously defi ning the upper limit of the domestic loans growth (for public 
consumption and certain sectors of the economy) affects the realization of 
the given cumulative growth of the foreign exchange reserves, as a policy 
of sustaining the country’s external liquidity and credibility. This is, in 
essence, a limitation of the aggregate consumption growth i.e. of the do-
mestic absorption above, and possibly below, the gross domestic product 
in order to realize balance-of-payments equilibrium; the fi rst consequence 
should be a reduction of the current defi cit to the point of its possibility 
of stable fi nancing from external capital (savings) infl ow, and the second 
consequence could be the creation of a surplus in the balance-of-payments 
current account so that external debts could be serviced.
Experience with the implementation of the described fi nancial programme in 
the conditions of high capital mobility proves that an absolute limitation of the net 
domestic assets does not suffi ce to stop the monetary aggregate growth in a broader 
sense (M4). Usually, monetary growth exceeds the set restrictions. In conditions 
when the currency exchange rate is given as a nominal anchor, the restrictions set 
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for the net domestic assets and monetary growth (in a broader defi nition of the 
term) are usually implemented. It is much harder to implement the set limitations 
if the exchange rate is not an anchor.12
When the currency exchange rate is a nominal anchor, a credit restriction breach 
can occur if the net external assets increase, thus causing monetary growth in a 
broad sense (M4). However, in such conditions a breach is much less likely to 
occur and it is easier to achieve anti-infl ationary aims. 13 In such circumstances 
a real appreciation of the national currency occurs, which can only partially be 
compensated by the growth of the global productivity of the national economy. 
Current experience, although not suffi cient, shows that those countries using the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor suffer a decrease in the competitiveness of 
their economies to a greater extent than the countries that have not specifi ed the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor. This is evident from the increase of imports 
compared to the period before the implementation of a fi nancial anti-infl ationary 
programme. In the other group of countries, which do not have the exchange rate as 
a nominal anchor, the relative increase of imports was not noted. A conclusion can 
be drawn that, when specifying a programme, the “trade off” should be considered 
between possible infl ation (price stability) and a decrease in competitiveness on 
the foreign market.
(2) The results of the implementation and the experience of the IMF fi nancial 
programmes in arrangements with certain countries are controversial:
• it is pointed out that the fi nancial programme is of a defl ationary character 
and that it “produces” poverty; the recession consequences of applying the 
programme are brought in connection with  insuffi cient funds provided by 
the programme; the strict insistence on the net external assets and other 
norms of execution has recessionary consequences;14 a need arose for in-
tegrating the fi nancial programme into an appropriate growth model with 
the explicit aim of the GDP growth, with the conditionality of a balance-
of-payments equilibrium; 
• The group of countries which were the most successful in the structural 
adjustment and growth  policy in Eastern Asia did not abide very strictly 
by the “orthodoxy” of the International Monetary Fund; according to their 
experience, a bigger role of domestic experts and the domestic political 
structure is a guarantee for a better national development priorities setting, 
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better adjustment of the corresponding policies to the needs of growth; the 
experience shows that the IMF has so far not shown enough inclination to 
“local programmes”  i.e. to the elaboration of programmes with the corre-
sponding involvement of  local experts; 
• it is pointed out that  structural adjustment with the condition of growth sho-
uld be the direction of the arrangement with the IMF; the strict application 
of the fi nancial programme i.e. the strict conditionality of the credit support, 
however, is justifi ed by the so called “catalyst effect” of the stabilization 
programme implementation; the results of this kind of catalysis, however, 
are not satisfactory 15
(3) Although the dominant aim of the IMF stand-by and the extended fi nancial 
programme is to secure the sustainability of the balance-of-payments equilibrium, 
and then the sustainability of the fi nancial and price stability within the country, 
eventually the IMF experts’ analyses increasingly asses the effects of the arran-
gements on the national economies’ growth rate as well as the growth of national 
savings and investment rates.
In the light of this, the results of the Monetary Fund’s stand-by arrangements 
with the transition countries of Middle Europe are considered unsuccessful accor-
ding to the criteria of GDP growth rates, investment and savings until 1992/1993. 
The arrangements with these countries are also conditioned by the transition reforms 
enforcement. The results of the arrangements as a whole showed that the recovery 
and growth process are not observed until the third year of implementation.16 The 
reasons for such results in the fi rst stage of the transition countries’ reform are con-
sidered to be (a) the structural impact of outdated technology, (b) the disintegration 
of the eastern socialist market and (c) the deterioration of the terms of trade. 
The effects of aggregate demand restrictions are under these circumstances 
quite controversial. So, for example, in Poland the ceiling on the credit growth in 
real terms and a strict limitation of the fi scal defi cit defi ned by the programme have, 
besides the deterioration of the terms of trade, caused a decline in production.17 In the 
period from 1990 to 1993 no European transition country, except Czechoslovakia, 
managed to follow the program through or to carry it out with no interruptions. So 
a thesis can be formulated that the “big bang” reform model has only enhanced 
the cumulative decline in production in these countries. This means that had, for 
example, a gradualist reform model been applied, a decline in production would 
not have occurred to such an extent. The decrease of investments is especially 
drastic. In spite of that, such a drastic decline in production cannot be ascribed to 
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a decrease of investments, because of the abundance of idle capacities. Basically, 
there has been a contradiction: the stagnation and the decrease of the investment 
share in GDP signifi es an unattractive environment for investments, especially 
for foreign investments; on the other hand, the possibility of fi nancing excessive 
imports i.e. creating a sustainable balance-of-payments current account defi cit as 
well as generating foreign exchange reserves due to stabilization measures should 
be considered as a confi dence providing factor. This should be a sign for investors 
that the stable fi nancial policy and deep structural changes can be trusted. 18  Ho-
wever, confi dence of this kind is low in this period. 
(4) The assessment of the success of the developing countries’ arrangements 
with the IMF is quite uncertain considering the savings rate: there has been a 
general increase of the savings rate by approximately one percentage point, but 
in a way that the public sector savings increased by 2.5 percentage points, with a 
decrease of the private rate by 1.5 percentage point. These results are considered 
to be weak. It should be concluded that the arrangements in most countries (from 
the analysis sample) are unsuccessful regarding the increase of the savings rate as 
a precondition of economic prosperity and growth. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the real interest rate policy, the real cur-
rency exchange rate policy, defi ning the credit policy and the fi nancial system 
reform have not, in the observed period and for the analyzed group of countries, 
had a systematically favourable effect on the formation of national savings. On the 
contrary, the effect on savings has remained weak and unpredictable.19
(5) The fi nancial programme is founded upon a basic assumption: that the 
control of domestic credit expansion solves the problem of the balance-of-payments 
current account defi cit, but also achieves the reduction of infl ation as one of the tar-
gets. If at the beginning there is a surplus of available production potentials, then the 
increase of domestic credits, DD, would result in an output increase. Price increases 
would be the main consequence of the increase of credits in the circumstances of 
the full utilization of the country’s production capacities, i.e. full employment of the 
labour force. The interpretation of the monetary approach policy to the balance of 
payments equilibrium is classical: an increase of nominal income leads to increased 
imports, and then to the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, which causes a 
decrease in the money supply. A decrease in the money supply causes a fall of prices 
and the consequence is better competitiveness of export sectors of the economy. 
So, the process circulates from the beginning to the end level and vice versa.20 It is 
a problem to endure the whole adjustment cycle when foreign exchange reserves 
S. ZDUNIĆ: Croatian Stabilization and Development Policy in the 1990s
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (3-4) 256-301 (2004)266
21 See:  /  10, p.  71  /  .
are insuffi cient. This is why there is a need for government intervention using the 
fi nancial programme instruments, primarily credit expansion control in order to 
restrain the aggregate demand. In developing countries, as well as in transition 
countries, when there are no abundant consumer credits granted by the banking 
system for mass consumption, and in conditions of an undeveloped fi nancial mar-
ket and a lack of corresponding instruments, credit restrictions dominantly affect 
manufacturing companies. This is because additional credit restrictions primarily 
affect the fi nancing of the working capital of the economy. In the fi rst iteration, this 
limits the supply level, even more than the level of aggregate demand, so the supply 
and demand gap increases further. 21  Investment fi nancing can also be considerably 
limited by this mechanism, especially because of the interest rate growth, so that 
economic growth is also put into question. Therefore, the most important objection 
to the monetary approach is that it basically does not resolve the problem of growth 
i.e. production recovery, both on the basis of aggregate demand and on the basis 
of supply. Recession implications are therefore inevitable.
As a consequence of the so-called neoliberal doctrine domination in interna-
tional fi nancial relations from the beginning of the 1980s, with the assumption that 
the main reason of the developing countries’ debt crisis, i.e. balance of payments 
crisis, is the uncompetitiveness of their national economies, a new stage of imple-
menting the fi nancial programme criteria begins. The new stage is characterized 
by including a microeconomic approach to the conditionalities of the arrangement 
with the Fund. This means that restructuring and institutional reform policies be-
come the components of the balance-of-payments long-term equilibrium strategy, 
by which the typical short-term characteristics of the earlier fi nancial programmes 
and their dominantly macroeconomic character are overcome. In the balance of 
payments domain this causes the domination of the balance-of-payments current and 
capital account liberalization doctrine with far-reaching development and structural 
implications. The equilibrium and stability of the balance of payments should be 
based upon the freedom of circulation of short-term and long-term capital on the 
basis of exchange rate stability and differences in real interest rates. In order to 
achieve this, the instruments of capital fl ow control should be abandoned. This is 
what actually determines the new stage of the world economy globalization, which 
is primarily based on fi nancial market mechanisms, as well as on some other well-
known GATT and WTO mechanisms. The basic precondition for establishing those 
global systems is macroeconomic adjustment i.e. creating macroeconomic stability, 
specifi ed by the arrangements with the Bretton-Woods institutions. The debt crisis 
has considerably increased the requirements for macroeconomic equilibrium so there 
were demands that the debtor countries’ balance-of-payments defi cits, amounting 
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to a couple of percentage points of GDP, should be transformed into a surplus in 
a very short period of time.22
Such requirements and the need for a turn have been justifi ed by the sup-
posedly wrong development policy of export substitution of the developing and 
former socialist countries. This was the main “development argument” of the neo-
liberal doctrine. It was especially supported by countries with strong transnational 
companies, which are at the same time the main stockholders of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.23
Therefore, the role of the IMF fi nancial programme with the performance 
criteria has been signifi cantly extended. Its aim becomes a complete institutional 
reform of the economic system as well as of macroeconomic and balance-of-pa-
yments equilibrium policy. Stand-by and extended arrangements become strictly 
conditioned by accepting wide economic system reforms, what means that they 
are medium and long-term by character and postulated fi nancial obligations. As 
it has so far been explained, the IMF makes the arrangements with the prevailing 
policy aim of achieving macroeconomic and balance-of-payments equilibrium, 
while the role of the World Bank is mostly determined by the neoliberal doctrine, 
and the policies are medium and long-term by their character. The basic policies 
and their objectives and targets in the arrangements with the World Bank are the 
following:24
• fi rst, the aim of structural “adjustment” is an increase of  GDP growth rate; 
the main method of achieving this is improving the allocative effi ciency 
of the pricing mechanism; price distortions should be eliminated, which 
contributes to  economic growth in real terms; real wages, as the labour 
cost factor, should be reduced, which contributes to a greater demand for 
labour and therefore to  increased production;
• second, the liberalization of the foreign trade system  should mean repla-
cing the import quotas by a tariff system adjusted to the WTO demands; 
the aim is to adjust  internal relative prices to world prices; liberalization 
of the capital account follows, but usually after the stage of foreign trade 
liberalization, and capital account liberalization means abolishing  foreign 
exchange transactions’ control, especially those connected with profi t and 
the return of invested foreign capital; in connection with this there can be 
problems of speculative capital and its impact on the stability of the balance 
of payments, the exchange rate and  prices; 
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• third, the deregulation of the internal fi nancial system, with the aim of 
achieving real interest rates and equalizing the return on various fi nancial 
assets; the growth of real interest rates should stimulate savings and entice 
the effi ciency of resource allocation; deregulation, on the other hand, sup-
poses an effi cient control and auditing of the fi nancial activities in order 
to secure the stability and credibility of the fi nancial system and market; 
some problems arise in the area of equity capital related to  fi nancial mar-
ket stability, especially during the privatization of large companies in the 
infrastructure sector;  a great amount of portfolio investments from the 
developed countries can, through an induced appreciation, have an unfa-
vourable effect on the current foreign trade balance;
• fourth, a labour market deregulation policy as well as tax system rationa-
lization are required;
• fi fth, the World Bank particularly insists upon the privatization of public 
companies; a strong stimulus for this policy came from Great Britain’s 
experience at the end of the 1980s, implemented by the Conservative go-
vernment.
The policy of liberalization and privatization has also had a social and poli-
tical motive: this policy was expected to restrain the business circles’ inclination 
towards corruption and reduce so-called rent seeking behaviour. The experience 
in this matter is, however, disappointing.
(6) In summary, it can be concluded that the results of the combined policies 
of stabilization, liberalization and privatization, on which the Bretton-Woods in-
stitutions insist, are often doubtful (and negative), which can be explained by the 
following: stabilization, as has already been pointed out, often causes a decrease 
of production or of the GDP growth rate for too long a period; the optimal stru-
cture of relative prices is not achieved: real interest rates are too high in cases of 
the exchange rate being used as an anchor; as a consequence of the foreign trade 
and the fi nancial system liberalization, the appreciation of the national currency 
is exaggerated, the purchasing power of wages is reduced, while at the same time 
they increase as an expense for exporters.25 Financial instability often appears on 
the stock and securities market, which is created through the privatization process 
of public companies, or state and socially owned companies in transition countries. 
Such instability is especially likely in the circumstances of an intense movement 
of capital into the country or away from the country, which is enabled by the libe-
ralized balance-of-payments capital account.26 
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The political implications of the above mentioned possible economic deve-
lopments are manifold, so the reform processes, conditioned by the IMF and the 
World Bank when making stand-by and other structural adjustment arrangements, 
should be carefully considered. A number of measures for improving or revising 
the functions of the Bretton-Woods institutions are suggested by many experts, 
scientists and in the general literature: those measures are concerned with natio-
nal development priorities and their adequate inclusion into structural adjustment 
arrangements. In the following chapters of this study, the Croatian stabilization 
and structural adjustment arrangements with the Bretton-Woods institutions are 
analyzed from this point of view. 
The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank 
in Croatian Economic Policy
(1) The basic instrument of the so-called monetary approach, as has already 
been described, is a “fi nancial programme” which (using a simple equation) links 
the domestic credit expansion (domestic net assets) of the banking system with the 
monetary aggregates, i.e. liquid money in a broad sense (M4) with the net external 
assets of the banking system as a whole or base money with the net external assets 
of the Central Bank.  In order to realize the ceilings of the domestic net assets 
growth, administrative instruments should be applied. If the fi nancial market of 
the country is underdeveloped, more restrictive measures are necessary. The more 
developed the market, the more indirect are the monetary policy instruments. In 
any case the administrative mechanism produces certain indicators, with a real and 
nominal signifi cance, such as the currency exchange rate, the interest rate, prices, 
and wages. This determines the level of investments, exports and imports, and then 
the appropriate gross domestic product. 
In 1994, under the fi rst stand-by arrangement, Croatia accepted to implement 
a similar set of measures. The basic purpose of accepting the arrangement was ma-
intaining price and balance-of-payments stability. This had already been achieved 
by the government’s price and fi scal policies. The aim of making the arrangement 
was to get the confi dence necessary for Croatian foreign debt rescheduling through 
the Paris and London Club. The new “extended arrangement” in 1997 expanded 
the earlier stand-by in two aspects:
• fi rst, according to the term it is almost medium-term (three years);
• second, it very explicitly includes institutional restructuring in terms of 
liberalization and privatization
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As far as the performance criteria are concerned, the difference between the 
fi rst and the second arrangement is in abandoning credit restrictions for the banking 
system as a whole but keeping the restrictions for the central bank (and its net dome-
stic assets). The restrictions remain for special groups of companies and the public 
sector. It was possible to abandon the growth criteria of the net domestic assets of 
the banking system as a whole because their aim had already been achieved: the 
growth of foreign exchange reserves, although of not very clear origin, had been 
achieved, as well as a slight rise in prices, the stability of the national currency 
exchange rate and the budget defi cit criteria were not overrun. The growth rate of 
GDP and of unemployment i.e. underemployment was included neither in the aims 
of the package, nor in the performance criteria. Thus, according to the defi nition, 
an external balance could be achieved, but also an internal balance according to 
the commodity price stability criteria.
The internal balance criteria in the form of full employment of the producti-
on capacities of the country and of the labour force was simply left out, i.e. it has 
been postponed as an aim for a future time. This means that the discount rate of 
the future social wellbeing equals zero. In other words, the urgency of this aim 
as a social and political priority was ignored. This is standard practice with these 
kinds of arrangements. The World Bank creation of policies for achieving this aim 
is considered to be a long-term goal. As has been shown before, the primary aim 
of the IMF’s policy is always achieving a balance-of-payments equilibrium, but in 
a short period of time, regardless of the short-term losses in terms of social well-
being. There is a very strict conditionality for getting credit support and national 
governments should accept this aim. Conditionality is expressed by “performan-
ce criteria”, as has been demonstrated, usually in terms of the rate of growth of 
domestic net assets of the banking system, i.e. in terms of the so-called nominal 
anchors. The performance criteria have on occasions successfully provided the 
wanted result, but often that was not the case. Regarding the performance, Croatia 
has been exemplary. It could even be said that Croatia was the most successful 
among the transition countries. The social cost, however, was among the highest if 
it is expressed in total unemployment rate and losses in GDP. An important reason 
for this are the appreciated exchange rate caused by the programme, as well as high 
interest rates, a credit shortage, and too low domestic and export demand in the 
circumstances of unutilized production capacities of the country. 
(2) Regarding the currency exchange rate policy, the following fact is im-
portant: 
• in the beginning of the IMF practice the currency exchange rate policy, 
national currency depreciation, was a conditionality item, and in a later 
stage it was expected before making the arrangement; later the exchange 
rate became an anchor in the anti-infl ationary policy.
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The Ex-Yugoslav arrangement also included a fi xed exchange rate as the no-
minal anchor. That could not be realized by the implemented instruments, due to 
political relations in the country and the character of the economic system. Croatia, 
on the other hand, has been very successful in applying the required instruments 
and maintaining a stable nominal exchange rate against DEM. The currency exc-
hange rate as a nominal anchor is actually included in the Croatian stand-by and 
extended arrangement, and its aim is achieving price stability. Over the short and 
medium-term, however, it does not include increasing the competitiveness of the 
economy on the world market, in order to support exports with the aim to overco-
me the balance-of-payments current account defi cit and employment recovery. A 
policy of preventing further appreciation is mentioned in the arrangement, though. 
In other words, the current level of the exchange rate is considered to be adequate 
i.e. in long-term real equilibrium rate, so the criteria of adequate monetary and 
fi scal instruments of the economic policy, that keep a stabilized current nominal 
exchange rate against the DEM, are fulfi lled.
It is estimated that a stabilization policy of this kind implies a GDP growth 
rate of 5% at most, with no guarantee that it will be long-term, so that policy can 
be considered consistent with such a growth rate. It, however, implies completely 
reduced or ignored priorities of the Croatian society regarding the once achieved 
level of employment. 
An important question arises, whether such a development strategy is the only 
possible strategy. Furthermore, whether it is a consequence of the cooperation with 
the IMF and the World Bank, implied by their current policy packages orientated 
towards neoliberal economic systems. In the fi rst three decades after Bretton Woods, 
fi nancial programmes were basically not in confl ict with the Keynesian doctrine 
according to which the national priorities of a country were attempted to be achi-
eved, expressed in full employment, at least over the medium-term. 
Croatian arrangements with the Bretton-Woods institutions obviously do not 
take into account the recession and post-war economic circumstances. The conseq-
uences of these arrangements are such as if we were dealing with full employment 
circumstances, so the aim of the programme could only be price and balance-of-
payments stability, with moderate long-term growth.27 The problem is that the 
recession of the economy was not taken into consideration.
(3) The fi rst stand-by arrangement of the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia and the IMF is of a standard type and very similar to the arrangements 
with other transition countries, which, besides the short-term aim of achieving a 
macroeconomic and balance-of-payments equilibrium, has the aim, and in certain 
elements the performance criteria, of institutional restructuring i.e. the reform of the 
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whole socialist economic system. In a narrow sense, the programme (arrangement) 
is conditioned by fulfi lling the usual criteria in the form of the set limits:
• an upper limit of the cumulative changes of the net credit of the banking 
system for the country as a whole;
• an upper limit of the cumulative defi cit of the country as a whole;
• an upper limit of cumulative changes of the net domestic assets of the 
banking system;
• lower limits of cumulative changes of the net foreign reserves of the banking 
system;
• additional quantitative restrictions for some sectors of the economy.
There are additional limitations in the changes of the average wages i.e. of 
the “wage-and-salary fund” as a whole, limitations of foreign debt or providing 
government collaterals for such debt, if required. 
It is evident from the performance criteria review that the fi rst Croatian arran-
gement was made according to a general “formula”.28 In the fi rst arrangements of 
Poland, other transition countries, and Croatia as well, the basic aim is achieving 
a macroeconomic and balance-of-payments equilibrium, as it is customary, while 
reforms are assumed.  In the beginning reforms are partially required. Extended 
arrangements, on the other hand, are very explicit concerning the conditioning of 
the reforms i.e. institutional restructuring. In the case of Croatia, this conditionality 
is mostly expressed in the following:29
• in the fi scal system and policy, besides the usual conditions, it is not allowed 
to fi nance the consolidated budget defi cit from banking sources, except for 
overcoming seasonal liquidity; an increase of the domestic public debt is 
not allowed; obligations of the tax system reform are introduced, such as 
value added tax, expansion of the tax base, tax discipline is strictly asked 
for; 
• subsidy reduction is required over the medium-term period, especially 
for the Croatian Railways; agriculture subsidies are transformed from an 
indirect system into a direct system; budgetary expenditure restructuring 
is directed towards the stimulation of growth;30 a 4-5% share of public 
investments in GDP is considered desirable; the budget defi cit is fi nanced 
only through external loans in the form of a government bond issue; in con-
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nection with the budgetary expenditure restructuring, stabilization efforts 
and structural adjustment in general, social welfare expenditures increased 
for an additional 1.4% of the GDP;
• pension insurance reform, in the form of the so-called three pillars, should 
support the national rate of savings and consequently long-term economic 
growth; the healthcare system should also be adjusted to narrower fi nan-
cing possibilities; followed by a number of administrative improvements in 
budget and public debt administration, and for that purpose the market of 
treasury bonds and earlier public debt securities (the so-called old foreign 
exchange savings, “big bonds” and their refi nancing) will be improved 
and reorganized upon new bases; a secondary equity market should be 
developed;
• in the area of the monetary system, reforms and stricter auditing and control 
of fi nancial institutions and equity markets are supported; privatization is 
supported as well; restructuring and recapitalization of many banks through 
privatization is assumed; it will be attempted to reduce the implementation 
of statutory reserve instruments in order to enable the better development 
of the fi nancial market; the process of creating investment funds and secu-
rities market will be completed institutionally; a Securities Commission, 
investment funds etc. will be founded; the company sector will be much 
more involved in the capital market (primary issue of stocks, a secondary 
stock and bond market);
• the privatization of the public companies is accelerating absolutely, and 
mass privatization is drawing to an end; privatization through “debt-equity 
swaps” is supported, as well as the use of Croatian Privatization Fund shares 
in the settling of renovation debts; the rest of the Croatian Privatization 
Fund portfolio should be privatized through sales to strategic investors, 
both foreign and domestic;
• in the area of the foreign trade system, the process of liberalization is 
intensely stimulated  and the protection comes down to the standards that 
meet the World Trade Organization criteria; this adjustments should be 
completed by 1997;
• in the area of balance of payments, the liberalization of the balance-of-
payments capital account transactions will be on the agenda, including 
the removal of external portfolio and direct investments restrictions  for 
residents and non-residents, as well as the transfer of capital; a gradual 
liberalization process is predicted here; 
Policies regarding the macroeconomic and balance-of-payments equilibrium 
assume standard measures and criteria, on the basis of an effi cient market mec-
hanism31:
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• using the national currency in all domestic transactions is stimulated, as 
well as the stabilization programme credibility;
• the exchange rate policy is the main support of the stabilization programme, 
along with maintaining the  fl oating of the exchange rate against the DEM 
according to very narrow limits; a depreciation of the exchange rate will 
not be allowed, and its stability will be maintained by the necessary restri-
ctions in the fi nancial policies; the appreciation of the kuna on the basis of 
a greater foreign capital infl ow will be neutralized, if necessary, by money 
sterilization although perhaps not entirely; other not strictly sterilization 
measures will be used, which insure that infl ation stays within the bands; 
if necessary, the representatives of the Fund will be consulted;
• the current account balance of payments defi cits are probably exaggerated 
due to statistical vaguenesses; the trade balance defi cit should be resolved 
by far-reaching structural reforms; the restructuring of banks and companies, 
development (fi nancial) support to the infrastructure and tourism should 
neutralize the current balance-of-payments defi cit; considering the vague 
sources of the foreign exchange infl ow (and the problems of statistical 
analyses) the foreign exchange rate and reserves, as well as the infl ow ba-
sed on foreign debt accumulation, represent a great support for the current 
balance of payments equilibrium32. For this purpose it is important to con-
tinue increasing foreign exchange reserves, a particular aim is increasing 
the confi dence in the value of the kuna i.e. the stabilization programme and 
fi nancial credibility on the world fi nancial market;
• quantitatively, the balance-of-payments current account should be reduced 
to about 4% of  GDP by the year 2000 (in 1996 it amounted 6.5%, and in 
1995 to 10% of the GDP); this can be achieved through  increased tourism 
revenues, through commodity exports growth of 8% annually, and thro-
ugh the increase of commodity imports at the growth rate of the GDP (in 
average, approximately 5% annually); fi nancing imports  by withdrawing 
deposits from abroad should gradually be abandoned;33
• external debt will be restricted at the limit of 30% of GDP; the servicing 
coeffi cient should not exceed 13% of the value of commodity and services 
export; the London and Paris Club have already accepted the policy of 
consolidating the external debt of the country;
• it is estimated that the foreign capital infl ow is too high; possible initial 
signs of infl ation will be carefully monitored, and because of that the cor-
responding instruments might have to be adjusted, such as sterilization to 
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a certain point; hereby the effect of appreciation on the competitiveness of 
the country will be assessed and the instrument (mechanism) of movement 
of capital out of the country liberalization will be implemented, as well as 
the use of regulation and control measures of the fi nancial operations of 
the banks, which might prevent the excessive capital entry;34 in order to 
neutralize the risk of a two-way capital fl ow, increasing the foreign exchange 
reserves is supported;
• the wage policy (growth), especially in the public sector and state-owned 
companies, will be strictly controlled; the cost of labour per employee should 
not exceed the current level (mid 1997); the salaries of the groups under 
special regime will be strictly controlled based on the monthly reports to 
the Fund; the employment i.e. unemployment statistics will be improved; 
according to the ILO methodology the unemployment rate would amount 
to 10%, and not 15.5%, as it is usually announced; thus, it is estimated that 
unemployment is overrated; unemployment support will be restricted to the 
imperiled groups; public companies will not be allowed to borrow abroad, 
except if they have permission from the Ministry of Finance for the needs of 
restructuring within the approved strict plan; all of this will be the concern 
of the Offi ce for Restructuring and Economics of State-Owned Compani-
es; the Croatian Privatization Fund must respect the discipline in terms of 
holding on to the criteria of the net credits of the banking system.
The arrangement, as it is evident, has been very minutely elaborated, with 
very strict restrictions and obligations, which do not leave a lot of space for various 
interpretations. The question, however, is how adequately it is suited for our real 
possibilities, needs and priorities. Only a scrutinized analysis of the state of the 
economy can provide the right and founded answer. 
The State Of The Croatian Economy And Structural 
Adjustment Policy
(1) The Croatian economy is still in the stage of a prolonged recession but 
gradually signs of recovery are appearing, measured by some macroeconomic 
variables.
Firstly, the Croatian economic recession was caused by well-known factors: 
the disintegration of the Eastern European socialist system and market (including 
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ex-Yugoslavia), and the war. These are both institutional and historical factors. 
The policy of getting out of such a recession is much more complex than the 
usual economic recovery policy of developed market economies. This is caused 
by insuffi ciency of institutions, mechanisms and instruments based on which the 
government could formulate and implement the strategy of production and growth 
recovery. Such insuffi ciency was present in developed capitalist countries during 
the 1929-1933 recession, also known as the Great Depression. The transition co-
untries today are burdened by a much larger institutional insuffi ciency, but also, 
theoretically and politically, with the problem of a correct perception of their own 
social and economic condition.  In Croatia, the war has also caused, due to defense 
expenses, low investment activity, and this is an important cause of the stagnation 
of our economy.
Secondly, the privatization policy, as it is being implemented here and in some 
other transition countries, should be considered as a cause of stagnation i.e. of too 
slow an economic recovery. Privatization policy has not taken into account the 
preservation and the rational utilization of the existing economic potentials and the 
introduction of modern management methods. It has been dominated by an explicit 
policy to change the ownership system, using inappropriate privatization methods. 
Economic agents have been acting in circumstances of high uncertainty, which 
has lead to the collapse of big companies and business systems, as well as to the 
absence of an appropriate development policy. The private sector of the economy 
was fragmented and has been stabilizing slowly. 
However, it is evident that the arrangements with the Bretton-Woods insti-
tutions, of all transition countries, ascribe the recession mostly to institutional 
insuffi ciency, so, besides the macroeconomic and balance-of-payments equilibrium 
policy, they include a structural policy. An aggregate demand stimulating policy 
with the aim of economic recovery is not included in the arrangements. Only re-
cently such policies began to be mentioned:35 “Extended fi nancial programme of 
the IMF (in Poland) for the period from 1991 to 1993 supposed a very optimistic 
growth rate of 15% annually for that level of investment. In 1990 it was consi-
dered that investments and net export would secure production recovery. It was, 
however, predicted that after a sharp decrease of production and real income, the 
recovery would be possible by stimulating consumption. The Polish programmes 
required a redistribution of expenditure from personal consumption to investments 
and net export, but the real growth took the opposite direction. This did not change 
until 1994 when a “classic recovery and growth model” began to be implemented. 
According to all of this, the economic recovery and growth then became a more 
explicit aim of monetary policy:
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• Polish GDP grows at a steady and high rate, 5.2% in 1994, 6.5% in 1995, and 
5.5% in 1996, while industrial production grows at the rates of 12%, 9.7% 
and 8.6% for the respective years, and they do not decrease in 1997. 
The question remains what the cause of the obvious turn in the production of 
the Polish economy was. Poland, besides, belongs to the group of countries experi-
encing many problems with the realization of stand-by and extended arrangements 
with the IMF. A realistic theory is that the cause of the turn might be the elements of 
demand stimulating policy. This is a possible interpretation of the statement “when 
a classic recovery and growth model began to be implemented” in the article by 
S. Gomulka.36 Here lies the importance of the central bank and the instruments it 
uses. The illustration of this role in Poland is evident from the following:
• the instrument of interest rate maximization was abandoned in 1990 and the 
credit expansion limitation was abandoned in 1993; in the Czech Republic 
this occurred in 1992 and 1993, respectively;
• the real currency exchange rate as an indirect aim of the monetary policy 
target was kept in Poland until 1994, but in 1995 and 1996 it was replaced 
by the nominal exchange rate policy in the given range of  ±7%; similar 
tendencies in the fi eld of exchange rate policies which existed in other 
transition countries. This means that after overcoming the high infl ation 
stage and achieving a certain level of macroeconomic stability, the dominant 
criteria of the exchange rate policy was “avoiding such a (real) currency 
exchange rate development which would contribute to the unsustainability 
of the external equilibrium”.37 In the future, as has been pointed out, these 
countries will have to resort to much more stable currency exchange rates, 
when they reach the stage of preparations to join the European Monetary 
Union, but for the time being, it is more rational to keep a higher level of 
monetary autonomy in order to overcome problems of excessive foreign 
capital infl ow, but also to maintain external equilibrium.
(2) The extended arrangement between Croatia and the International Monetary 
Fund from 1997 also includes some new elements, which in the fi eld of monetary 
policy might be interpreted as an improvement i.e. as abandoning some rigid mo-
netary restrictions with the orientation towards indirect instruments, which have 
been implemented for some time in other transition countries:
• the most important novelty is abandoning the strict net domestic assets 
restrictions of the banking system as a whole, but keeping it at the level of 
the Croatian National Bank; this practically means an issue of base money 
only in the framework of foreign exchange coverage; foreign exchange 
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reserves have practically become the only channel of monetary base crea-
tion in Slovenia38 since 1991; in Croatia the M1 aggregate has a more than 
100% coverage in the foreign exchange reserves of the Croatian National 
bank, and base money even more; the monetary aggregate growth in the 
broad sense is ever more frequently based on the net external assets of the 
banking system, and the role of the net domestic assets in money creation 
is decreasing: in December 1994 the share of the domestic net assets in 
the M4 aggregate amounts to 93.5%, net external assets to 6.5%, and in 
March 1997 the analogue percentages are 68% and 32%;  domestic credit 
expansion is signifi cantly slower than the M4 monetary aggregate as well 
as from the net external assets of the banking system. The analogue incre-
ases of monetary aggregates in the mentioned period are: index 132 for 
domestic credit, index 224 for M4 aggregate, and for net external assets of 
the banking system the index is 1113 (171 for the Croatian National Bank), 
for M1 aggregate the index is 166, and for the base money in the period 
from December 1994 to March 1997 the index is 179; it is evident that the 
growth dynamics of the foreign exchange reserves of the Croatian National 
Bank, of the base money and M1 is quite steady (around index 170), that 
the domestic placement of loans is signifi cantly behind (index 132), but 
that they are considerably exceeded by the M4 money demand index; the 
main component of the M4 are foreign exchange deposits.
From all these fi gures and their relationships it is evident that a ceiling on 
net domestic assets, that is on crediting the domestic economy, has given very 
convincing results in the growth of foreign exchange reserves, the offi cial ones 
as well as those of the banking system as a whole; the offi cial foreign exchange 
reserves have been transformed into national monetary aggregates, while the private 
ones were transferred as foreign exchange savings to foreign banks and have been 
returned to a certain extent as loans for the domestic economy. So the abundant 
foreign exchange supply and low domestic credit supply secured a stable nominal 
exchange rate, which is now becoming an explicit nominal anchor.
(3) On the central bank level this is evident from the interrelations of the net 
domestic assets D, net external (foreign exchange) assets RI, base (reserve) money 
B, and the nominal effective exchange rate index IET (Table 1).
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Table 1
MOVEMENTS OF THE NOMINAL CURRENCY RATE AND THE 
MONETARY AGGREGATES OF THE CROATIAN NATIONAL BANK 
FOR THE PERIOD FROM THE 4TH QUARTER 1993 
TO THE 4TH QUARTER 1996
Year       IET*             D            RI             B
Quarter million kuna million kuna million kuna
        1               2              3             4              5
1993   IV
1994    I
1994   II
1994   III
1994   IV
1995    I
1995    II
1995   III
1995   IV
1996    I
1996    II
1996   III





















































* Note: Indexes based on 4 October 1993 =100; data according to the Croatian National Bank 
Bulletin and Main Statistical Indicators NBC, various numbers; data from the end of the stated 
quarters.
The table shows that during the whole observed period the foreign component 
of the monetary base – the net external assets RI – in the period from 1993 to 1996 
(last quarter) increased from index 100 to index 300, base money increased over 
the same period from 100 to 390, so the share of base money in external assets rose 
from approximately 0.58 (58%) to 0.75 (75%). The base money is still suffi ciently 
covered by the offi cial foreign exchange reserves, which secures the convertibi-
lity of the kuna in the present monetary aggregate relations, but also points to the 
possible larger expansion of base money, and then by multiplication of M1 money 
supply and domestic credit. The room for increasing base money is up to at least 
zero value of the domestic component, D, of the monetary base B i.e. up to the 
equating net external assets RI with the monetary base B.39
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The new extended arrangement of the Fund and the Croatian Government 
determines the growth of the share of the domestic component of base money from 
negative absolute values to zero value, which means that for future increases the 
B/RI ratio will rise to approximately number one; it means that the future growth 
of the external net assets of the central bank would not be sterilized on the base 
money level. This creates more room for the supply of money, and thus for credit 
expansion. So the arrangement does not include a credit ceiling for the economy 
as a whole, after singling out a group of 31 companies.
The sterilization of the money supply with the aim of reducing the credit sup-
ply will be conducted by other mechanisms of a market character, if the nominal 
anchor in the form of currency exchange rate and price growth bands would be 
breached. Namely, in the fi nancial programmes of the IMF based on the so-called 
Polak model40, target values for the increase of the general price level are determi-
ned, as well as the increase of the real domestic product and the level of foreign 
exchange (international) reserves.  The target value of the foreign component of the 
base money is determined by the aim of the foreign exchange reserves, and thus the 
foreign components of the money supply are determined. As the target increase of 
the general prices level should be consistent with the money supply level (M1) and 
with the target increase of the real domestic product, and then with the assumption 
of the constant speed of money circulation, this necessarily determines the level 
and the rate of the domestic component of base money.
Should, however, an expected abundant foreign exchange infl ow occur on the 
basis of the service sector of the economy and if the foreign debt accumulation of 
the domestic economic sector and the state continues, the monetary authorities will, 
because of the nominal anchors’ target, implement a restrictive monetary policy 
through sterilization of the foreign exchange infl ow. This means that the increase 
of the net domestic assets will again be constrained, all the way to negative values, 
if necessary. This will keep the appreciated exchange rate of the national currency 
and the nominal currency exchange rate on the exogenously given level. And this 
will diminish the export ability of the Croatian economy i.e. diminish the ability to 
reduce the current defi cit, as has been predicted by the new extended agreement. 
The goods and services trade defi cit will cause a need for fi nancing through further 
debt accumulation abroad. All of this calls for a reconsideration of the monetary, 
exchange rate, credit and development policy, because the current economic policy 
can lead to unsustainability of the country’s balance of payments over the medium 
and long-term.
(4) The announced nominal exchange rate stability should be maintained by 
the following instruments:
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• restriction of placing the loans, i.e. fi nancing the working capital until it 
reaches a 7% growth, to 31 specially determined clients after “cleaning” 
their books; before the “cleaning” the credits to special clients amounted to 
one quarter of total credits granted by all banks, after the “cleaning” they 
should not amount to more than 10%; in the fi rst four months of 1997 the 
share of these companies in new loan placement amounted to 12%, while 
in the following two months it was only 2.5%; the space for recovery and 
growth of these companies is obviously very narrow;41 those companies 
that are undergoing the process of privatization, however, are not limited 
on the credit market; in this way the stabilization policy was integrated into 
the policy of restructuring i.e. privatization; 
• M1 money supply rate should be faster than at the moment, related to the 
foreign exchange reserves; should the credit supply for the rest of the eco-
nomy increase, net domestic assets might increase faster than the current 
dynamics; should such an accelerated increase cause a depreciation of the 
kuna, the Croatian National bank is obliged to take measures in order to 
keep the nominal anchor in the given framework; such measures are stan-
dard procedure in such circumstances;42
• increasing legal reserves (the programme predicts a reduction!); issue of 
National Bank bills as an instrument of sterilization;
• if necessary, direct credit expansion restrictions should be implemented, as 
well as restricting the wage growth; a reduction of interest rates as a result of 
softening the monetary policy is predicted, but this is not an explicit target 
variable; the softening (through legal reserves reduction, for example!) is 
understood in the framework of the exchange rate target;
• in the case of too high a foreign capital infl ow (short-term, above all) abo-
lishing the outfl ow control of domestic capital in the capital account of the 
balance of payments is predicted; this means that keeping the stability of 
the nominal exchange rate against DEM by means of instruments consi-
stent with market mechanisms in the fi nancial system will be attempted; 
this policy had, to a certain extent, been implemented by the instrument of 
high legal reserves for foreign exchange deposits (over 50% of the foreign 
exchange deposits); the target of that instrument was covering foreign 
exchange liquidity risk in Croatian specifi c circumstances.
It can be concluded that the new fi nancial programme might produce greater 
credit expansion, and thus a growth of GDP. The growth is estimated, as an impli-
cation and not as an explicit aim of the programme, at about 5% a year in average. 
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If it is taken into account that Croatian economy is experiencing a recession and 
that capacities are underutilized, this should not be a very diffi cult task: tourism, 
construction and traffi c with some locally oriented industries can easily achieve 
that aim with a small credit expansion. The cost in terms of lost GDP in order to 
maintain the nominal anchor under such circumstances, therefore, can still be very 
high.  Such a conclusion will be correct until we reach at least the prewar GDP 
and employment level. 
(5) The question of an alternative approach to fi nancial programming arises 
due to the high costs of tightly keeping the set exchange rate as a nominal anchor. 
Such an alternative would have the following starting points:
• an appropriate GDP growth rate should be explicitly set (say 8-9%) and the 
instruments of the programme should be adjusted to this aim, with strict 
criteria of consistency in terms of available economic capacities and the real 
domestic and foreign demand; that should be the basic analytical starting 
point i.e. a development aim; net domestic assets of the banking system 
should follow the growth rate target set in this way; it should not violate the 
rule of net domestic assets, broadly defi ned liquid money43 and net foreign 
exchange external assets; the consistency of these relationships should se-
cure the criteria of stabilization and the balance-of-payments equilibrium 
sustainability. The quantitative performance criteria should be set in such 
a way that the demanded growth is not threatened, and that the transition 
towards a market economy is guaranteed. Our monetary authorities would 
have the delicate and diffi cult task of  “servicing” the needs of growth, and 
at the same time maintaining price, interest rate and exchange rate growth 
within the targeted bands, as well as keeping the balance-of-payments eq-
uilibrium. It should be noted that the fi nancial programme methodology in 
fact usually starts from the analytically assumed GDP growth rate. In the 
Croatian circumstances it should be a rigid target variable, and not an assu-
med implication. In this way, there are fi nancial possibilities for achieving 
targeted variables in Croatia, as has already been analytically shown.44
Finally, a great rigidity of monetary transmission mechanisms point to the 
need of their restructuring, in order to produce acceptable indicators (interest rates, 
exchange rate and prices) for entrepreneurs and the fi nancial market. Quantitative 
ceilings in the form of performance criteria of stand-by arrangements are partly 
motivated by the need to restrict the placement of loans to unprofi table companies 
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and projects i.e. to banks. They have not succeeded to resolve the problem of mo-
ney and credit allocation effi ciency. This effi ciency is supposed to be produced by 
the market transmission mechanism within the postulated restrictions. As this has 
not been achieved, the question of the necessary restriction restructuring arises. It 
is being done, for now, in cases of some large public and state-owned companies. 
After that, the market mechanisms were supposed to “produce” economically ac-
ceptable indicators, interest rates and exchange rate. Since the market transmission 
mechanisms are still producing high interest rates and an appreciated exchange 
rate, these questions arise:
• whether the performance criteria were set too narrowly regarding Croatian 
fi nancial and real potentials, and the monetary policy instruments’ relation-
ships are inconsistent; whether the exchange rate anchor matches the price 
defl ation criteria and the criteria of targeted economic growth rate at the 
same time; whether a better performance of the market mechanism, that 
could be expected on the basis of the interest rate indicator, would generate 
as a consequence larger net domestic assets, also based on short-term foreign 
capital infl ows, and thus enable the higher utilization of available economic 
capacities; whether this has been prevented by the postulated quantitative 
restrictions of the net assets being too low, which has been implied by an 
absolute priority of price stability criteria within the range of a three-percent 
infl ation rate; this priority was prerequisited by psychological factors, and 
has been realized by an a priori accepted low GDP growth rate as a spon-
taneous consequence, regardless of the underemployment of the available 
economic and fi nancial potentials of the country.
• The confl ict of the interest rate and exchange rate function with the function 
of the quantitative restrictions of net domestic assets on the fi nancial market 
i.e. of the statutory reserves as the primary instrument of the monetary policy 
is apparent. This is an issue of inadequate connection of aggregate goals, 
intermediate targets, performance criteria and the standard monetary policy 
instruments. It is obvious that redefi ning the fi nancial programme and the 
GDP growth projection should be done in the next step, so as to adjust the 
projection with the peculiarities of the monetary transmission mechanisms, 
in order to achieve acceptable indicators, exchange rate and interest rates. 
The new extended arrangement includes elements of that kind of redefi niti-
on, but fi rmly keeping the exchange rate and price growth rates as nominal 
anchors does not promise production and employment recovery.
(6) Hence, it can be expected that the development consequences of such 
instruments of the stand-by and the extended arrangement will be very similar:
• the export and import substitutable sectors are exposed to too strong ex-
ternal competition due to the appreciation of the kuna, which continues to 
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cause a current balance-of-payments defi cit, which is unsustainable over 
the long-term;
• the tradable goods’ price stability has been kept by import competition 
which also disables a larger increase of exports i.e. the local goods and 
services generate pressure on the global price index growth, so this is the 
basis of the appreciation of the kuna and of the decreasing profi tability of 
the export sector of the economy;
• the latest statistical data on the current balance of payments still do not 
show an achievement of the aim of closing the trade defi cit; that is an 
explicit aim of the extended arrangement; the main support for closing the 
defi cit will continue to be the service sector (primarily tourism, remittances, 
traffi c) but this has proven to be insuffi cient; the structural consequences 
on this basis take two directions: fi rst, the sector structure of the econo-
my is dominated by the service sector and local and small-scale industry; 
and second, the regional mapping of  such an economic structure, due to 
losing formerly strong regional export sectors (the engineering industry, 
metal industry, textile industry, shipbuilding, and agriculture), creates an 
unacceptable structure of job supply; this causes too great development 
disparities among the regions; economic migration as well as interregional 
labour reallocation could be very strong; in essence, the Croatian economy 
is growing into a regional appendage of Central Europe and the European 
Union, with a characteristically developed infrastructure and tourism and 
local economy as the basic activities; industry and agriculture lose their 
importance as base export activities. This is very clearly shown by some 
projections, elaborated as analytic scenarios and in which the elasticity of 
commodity exports in relation to the GDP rate of growth is less than one. On 
the other hand it can be noted that this is postulated correctly in the extended 
fi nancial arrangement with the IMF: commodity exports should grow at a 
rate of 8%, and GDP at a rate of 5% annually on average. Considering the 
fact that the exchange rate as a nominal anchor should maintain its current 
established stable level and that the instruments were set according to this 
criterion, the question remains whether this aim is achievable during the 
arrangement period. That this question is well founded is confi rmed already 
by the statistical data from August 1997. 
The key question here is whether adjustment with the aim of establishing a 
long-term macroeconomic and balance-of-payments equilibrium, as well as the 
required growth rate, can be achieved over the medium-term using the instruments 
of institutional restructuring, liberalization and privatization policy, as has been set 
by the extended arrangement. The exchange rate and interest rates policies have in 
the programmes been connected only with the stabilization goals but not with the 
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goals of economic growth. In the given framework, set by the IMF arrangement, 
the World Bank is attempting to fi nd room and an appropriate development policy 
for the development of the Croatian economy. The framework given by the IMF 
arrangement is the following:
• GDP growth at an average annual rate of about 5% ;
• stable nominal exchange rate of the kuna against the DEM;
• stable prices at the global level of Western Europe.
As has already been pointed out, regarding the available unutilized real and 
fi nancial capacities of the country, the realization of the postulated aims will not be 
a problem. Structural implications and higher growth dynamics are key social and 
political requirements of the Croatian medium and long-term strategy. In order to 
clarify this, the basic fi ndings and the World Bank’s recommendations for medium-
term development of Croatia follow on the next pages. It is done according to a 
preliminary study presented to the departments of the Croatian Government. 
The World Bank analysis45 starts from the framework given by the IMF ar-
rangement and by “supply side” policy instruments and is attempting to achieve 
the following:
• Achieving a cost adjustment of the economy to external competition by 
keeping the policy of a stable nominal exchange rate and relatively stable 
prices, like in the European Union. This means a real wages reduction and 
a reduction of the number of the employed, a reduction of the cost of capi-
tal (interest rates), reduction of  “public expenditure” i.e. tax payments on 
the level of companies and citizens, reduction of fi xed unit costs, as well 
as a reduction of operating and variable costs of all sorts by management 
improvements. The result of all that would be an improvement of the ability 
to maintain the given level of the exchange rate on the market. The antimo-
nopoly policy should be improved by foreign trade system liberalization 
along with a stable nominal exchange rate policy.  The problem is how to 
reduce costs and adjust them to nominal stabilization anchors in conditions 
of high public expenditure, in conditions of a narrowed domestic and fore-
ign market and, above all, in conditions of a low long-term capital supply 
and low direct investments into the tradable sector. Due to high interest 
rates and the appreciated kuna, investments into fi nancial instruments and 
short-term credit become more attractive. The risk on the fi nancial market 
has been increasing due to the infl ow of short-term speculative capital. 
This is exaggerated by the fact that our economy is not yet involved in any 
regional trade integration.
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Then, concrete economic policy measures are also suggested in the following 
areas:46
• company restructuring, privatization, bank restructuring and improving the 
supply function of the banking system as well as the capital market reform 
together amount to  a kind of supply side measure;
• public sector reforms should be development-oriented, especially the pensi-
on and healthcare system reforms; budgetary expenditure restructuring in the 
post-war period together with tax system reform should be appropriate.
(7) The strategy suggested in this way should be compared with a possible 
alternative development strategy that would be specifi ed in stages, in accordance 
with the development moment of the economy. The priority of an alternative stra-
tegy would be getting out of recession, i.e. achieving the warranted and required 
GDP and employment growth rate.
(a) In the World Bank’s study in the fi rst place there is a conclusion of weaker 
performances of the Croatian economy in relation to other Central European tran-
sition countries in the period from 1989/90 to 1996. It is stated that other transition 
countries experienced the recession stage and the macroeconomic imbalance just 
like Croatia. When stability was achieved, the more successful countries gradually 
performed a healthy production and productivity recovery cycle, with favourable 
effects on real wages, national savings and investments. In Croatia such develop-
ment did not occur: productivity did not recover like in those countries, and real 
wages recovered much faster and reached the level from 1989/90.47 The lag of 
industrial recovery is especially evident in Croatia, where the production remains 
at barely 50% of prewar production. So, the real wages and consumption recovery 
diminishes national savings and external equilibrium, which represents a serious 
obstacle for future growth. The idle capacity and the increase of effi ciency could 
help the recovery in the fi rst stage (as was the case in 1996 and 1997), but the 
current savings and investments level could help long-term recovery. The reasons 
for such a condition, as it is pointed out in the study,48 are twofold:
• fi rstly, structural reform lags are obstacles for the improvement of the 
economic system’s allocative effi ciency and productivity gains in terms 
of GDP; reform lag is caused by the state ownership of major companies 
(infrastructure also) and “insider privatization” by employees; this is why 
the infl uence of the traditional interest groups remains; the banking system 
has made it possible to keep “soft budget constraints” for some time, because 
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such new owners of the companies became the owners of the banks; the 
actual implementation of the banking system reform is supposed to change 
that environment; 
• secondly, the volume and the public fi nance structure diminish national 
savings and growth.
This is followed by a recommendation that Croatian economic policy should 
stimulate both the companies and the fi nancial system in the direction of an adeq-
uate supply reaction. Then, the public sector must be oriented in the same direction 
through structural reform improvement. Public investment should attract private 
investments.
The necessity of budget expenditure restructuring and its reduction is especially 
pointed out. It could be an additional source of development fi nancing. 
Along with these conclusions and recommendations, the following should 
be noted:
• the restructuring, foreign trade system liberalization49 and privatization recom-
mendations are of a typically “supply side” microeconomic orientation;
• the macroeconomic policy and environment is simply taken as it was given 
by the IMF arrangements; 
• analytical comparisons with other transition countries are on the level of 
pure comparison of the achieved economic results and microeconomic 
policies; different macroeconomic environments with the corresponding 
policies are not analyzed as possible factors that could have generated the 
differences in the results. The different concept approaches in the recovery 
are not separately analyzed. The different strategic approaches, however, 
have caused the differences of the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
policies. It is obvious from the following: although a recession perception 
of the economic condition, Croatian as well as those of other transition 
countries, has partly been adopted in the World Bank’s study, the lag with 
the structural reforms has been taken as the main factor of a prolonged 
recession in Croatia, because of which a possible “productivity gain” was 
absent; then “insider privatization” is taken as an important lag factor. It 
should be stressed that the public expenditure volume and structure caused 
by war circumstances are accepted but only as a temporary cause of the lag. 
Gradualism in reducing the volume and restructuring public expenditure 
are accepted but are supposed to be market-oriented.
A realistic approach in the analysis of the Croatian economic lagging behind 
other transition countries should, in our opinion, distinctly (and not sporadically), 
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start from the recession perception of the state of the national economy. That per-
ception would require a substantially higher GDP rate of growth and labour force 
employment rates. In this way, over the medium-term, the elementary social priority 
of the country expressed in full labour force employment and the employment of 
the fi nancial and economic potentials of the country could be achieved. This does 
not mean disregarding the necessary institutional and production restructuring of 
the economy but not according to the criteria of mainstream neoliberal doctrine. It 
is important to note and accept that the need for economic recovery and growth is in 
certain confl ict with the long-term character of the institutional, technological and 
production restructuring. This fact requires establishing the development strategy of 
the country by stages. The sequence and time limit of the corresponding structural 
policies stipulated in the strategy are essential. The urgency of recovery must be 
simultaneously accepted as early as the fi rst strategic stage. 
(b) The comparison of our labour costs with the costs of other transition co-
untries expressed in dollars shows the following:
• a high national currency depreciation in the transition countries compared 
to a highly appreciated kuna gives an image of low wages expressed in 
dollars in the competitive transition countries, while Croatian wages are 
substantially higher;
• when wages are expressed in purchasing power parity of the dollar in in-
dividual countries, it is evident that the wages purchasing power is quite 
balanced, with the exception that in the Czech Republic the wages are higher 
than in Croatia; in Croatia the wages expressed in purchase power parity 
and in current commercial exchange rate of the national currency are very 
close (almost the same), while in other transition countries these differences 
range between 1.5 and 3 i.e. wages expressed in dollars should be multiplied 
by these coeffi cients in order to calculate their real purchasing power. In 
1995 this ratio barely reaches 1.11 and 1.13 in Croatia and Slovenia. It is 
obvious that the currency exchange rate policy was not taken in Croatia as 
an instrument of export stimulation i.e. of the reduction of cost expressed 
in dollars; other transition countries, apart from Croatia and Slovenia, due 
to low productivity, use the exchange rate policy to support their econo-
my on the world market. Croatia can settle this difference in costs only 
through productivity on the European level, and not with relative prices 
on the domestic market. A longer period of time is required to achieve the 
European productivity level, and other transition countries have taken it 
into account, while Croatia exposed its tradable sector to the severe world 
market competition too early. This is the reason for requiring protection 
measures, especially in agriculture and industry.
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. The conclusion on credit expansion space is very important. The two institutions disagree on the 
matter! 
This is not a simple problem, but it is obvious that it is not being perceived by 
the domestic economic policy and the analyses and attitudes of the Bretton-Woods 
institutions.50
(c) In the monetary sphere, as a consequence of the fi nancial programme in-
cluded in the stand-by and extended arrangement, the current state of the economy 
should be taken into account when the programme starts to be implemented.
In the analysis of the credit expansion effects, it is important to evaluate the 
initial state of the economy. Namely, if the initial state of the monetary aggregates 
is not in equilibrium wrong conclusions can be derived: 
• if the share of the net external assets of the banking system in the initial 
status is, for example, 14% of the GDP, and the share of placed loans 
40%; then, if the share of the external net assets in the GDP increases by 
4 percentage points, which will at the end of the process amount to 18 
percentage points, and if the share of placed loans increases by additional 
8 percentage points, which will in the end amount to 48 percentage points 
of the share, the result of all that will be that the increase of the net external 
assets in the end amounts to 28%, and of the placed loans only 20%.  This 
shows that the aggregate movements worked more to the advantage of the 
external net asset growth i.e. the growth of foreign exchange reserves than 
by means of a monetary transmission mechanism, for the benefi t of credit 
expansion; after all, in Croatian circumstances that was the aim of the ce-
iling on the net domestic assets growth by the stand-by arrangement. So, 
the conclusion that there was room for credit expansion is correct, but the 
reason why that did not occur is in the fi nancial programme of the stand-by 
arrangement.51
• it can easily be concluded from a comparative analysis that the Croatian 
initial state is not in equilibrium: in Spain, for instance, in 1988 the share of 
net domestic assets in the GDP amounted to about 8% and of the banking 
system placement of loans to the economy, non-state sector, amounted to as 
much as 62%. In Croatia in 1995/96 these shares amount to approximately 
13% and 35-40% respectively; the experience of the countries using the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor and with infl ation of over 10% in the 
stabilization programme period in 1991/92 shows that the M4 monetary 
S. ZDUNIĆ: Croatian Stabilization and Development Policy in the 1990s
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (3-4) 256-301 (2004)290
52 See  /  2, p. 25  /  and  /  14  / .
53 See  /  14, Chapter  4, item 4.15  /  .
54 See on the subject in  /  15  /  .
aggregate growth is, on average, primarily based on the domestic net assets 
growth, and always to a smaller extent on the net external assets growth 
(approximately 22% and 18%, which results in M4 growth of 40%);52 in 
Croatia these relations are reversed, that is external net assets are in the 
fi rst place, followed by domestic net assets.
The specifi c characteristics of individual countries are too different from 
the comparative analysis point of view to give a fi nal opinion on the character of 
developments in Croatia. However, indications of insuffi cient credit expansion 
are evident and can be considered as one of the important factors of the Croatian 
economic recession. Exchange rate stability is an initial prerequisite of constrained 
credit expansion. As credit expansion possibility exists in the fi nancial (monetary) 
sphere, this possibility also exists in the real sphere in the form of unused capaci-
ties. This conclusion, however, does not refute the conclusions about the need for 
a structural policy in the areas of the banking and economic system as a whole. It 
only confi rms that there must not be a confl ict between a different macroeconomic 
policy (both credit and exchange rate policies!) and a restructuring policy.
The extended arrangement with the IMF in this respect would mean an impro-
vement, if it is connected with the suggestions from the World Bank’s analysis.53 
It means that abandoning the commercial banks’ obligation of redepositing 55 % 
foreign exchange deposits in foreign banks would mean a “softening” of monetary 
restrictions and a signifi cant reduction of domestic statutory reserves and a way of 
developing a system of possible sterilization by national bank bills. Such measures 
should have strong implications on money and credit supply, they would not exceed 
the fi nancial potential of the country and they would support the supply of economic 
agents on the market of the country. The question remains whether these suggestions 
are coordinated between the Bretton-Woods institutions i.e. whether they are correc-
tly stipulated in the complete development strategy. The issue of interrelationships 
and consistency of such suggestions with the aim of a stable nominal exchange rate 
of the kuna against the DEM and infl ation within the bands of the European Union 
is of great importance. Due to its feedback effects the sustainability of exogenously 
strictly set nominal anchors could be put into question. 
This is usually a current issue in countries with an undeveloped fi nancial 
market, with an underdeveloped stock and equity market of the non-banking eco-
nomic sector. Under such circumstances, the so-called monetary credit channel 
transmission mechanisms54 operate in the following way: a restrictive monetary 
policy reduces the excess reserve money of the banking system due to a sudden 
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increase of the central bank’s legal reserves; the reduced excess reserve money 
reduces the possibility of granting credits, that is the monetary multiplicator and 
money supply is reduced; due to the resulting reduction in the credit supply the 
commercial orders reduce; followed by a decrease of production, investments and 
supplies as well as net export, and fi nally  GDP decreases; then the credit channel 
transmission mechanism indirectly links the interest rate and currency exchange 
rate mechanisms with their own implications.
In Croatian circumstances there are clear signs of monetary transmission mec-
hanism inconsistency, because the initial anti-infl ationary state of the monetary-cre-
dit mechanism was neither equilibrated nor stable. This means that the interrelations 
of the basic monetary aggregates were not balanced in the beginning, because the 
state of the national economy was underemployed. The monetary policy, hereby, 
renounces its role in the production recovery and the reactivation of idle economic 
capacities in the framework of the available fi nancial resources. From the fastest 
growth of the primary (base) money in the observed period, for example, related 
to the monetary aggregates of the money supply and to the placement of loans, it 
can be concluded that the primary money multiplication through the transmission 
mechanism was too low. The consequence was not meeting the total credit demand. 
In the production recovery and the available economic capacity reutilization stage 
this multiplication should be much higher. 
Monetary transmission processes always take place in a certain period of time, 
and the beginning of the period was given by a certain monetary shock in the form 
of a monetary restriction which generates specifi c transmission indicators. The 
research on the length of the transmission process in the USA for the period from 
1965 to 1993, which had the aim of establishing the reaction of the variables to a 
monetary shock caused by the monetary policy with an indirect (transmission) aim 
of increasing the short-term interest rate in the banking system, showed that the 
adjustment time was actually quite brief, i.e. that the recovery comes relatively soon 
after the monetary shock. The long time shock recovery process in the Croatian eco-
nomy actually points to a high level of transmission mechanism underdevelopment 
and rigidity in the Croatian banking system and infl exibility of the real economic 
structure. This means that the assumption that the transmission will be performed 
in a “standard” way under Croatian circumstances should be abolished. In terms of 
this, it is possible to interpret Croatian economic processes in the following way: 
1) the reactions of the main economic variables to the monetary shock caused by 
the stabilization programme do not match the (shorter) duration of such reactions 
in a developed economy; economic activities were at the beginning of the mone-
tary shock at the level of approximately 55% of the total economic potential of the 
country, which is not typical of developed countries. In Croatia the fi rst reactions 
caused by the shock are remaining for the fourth year, with still a weak tendency 
of improvement in spite of the initial low level of activity. This means that the 
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monetary transmission mechanisms with respect to the improvement of economic 
indicators are very rigid; 2) the low comparability of transmission mechanisms in 
Croatia was caused by special external factors: fi nancial transfers and short-term 
external credit fi nancing enabled a rise of the fi nal demand on the domestic market; 
the excessive foreign competition entry on the domestic market substituted the 
domestic supply by foreign supply, so there was no recovery of GDP; 3) the weak 
performance of the fi nancial market, especially under war circumstances, caused 
the interest rate to grow steadily and be very rigid, as well as the appreciation of the 
exchange rate. The appreciation level was incurred by low national income, and in 
that way by the weak demand for foreign money. That was the consequence of the 
monetary-credit policy, which caused the so-called underemployment equilibrium 
of the real and fi nancial sectors of the economy.
In the following pages, therefore, we will examine the currency exchange rate 
policy and the foreign trade system liberalization from the competitiveness point 
of view. These aspects are very important in the medium-term recovery and gro-
wth policy. This aspect of analysis is absent from the Bretton-Woods institutions’ 
documents regarding the Croatian arrangement.
(d) Adjusting the currency exchange rate and the competitiveness of the eco-
nomy. The economic aim attempted to be achieved by an appropriate exchange 
rate policy comes down to two things:
• fi rst, the stabilization of prices which implies the nominal exchange rate as 
an anti-infl ationary policy anchor; 
• second, the competitiveness of the economy on the foreign and domestic 
market which over the short- and medium-term implies a real exchange 
rate depreciation policy.
This is a question of fi nding a certain trade-off between the two aims; it could 
be said that this is a question of combining appropriate policies, which would meet 
the dynamic growth demand but stay within the stabilization framework. The pur-
pose of supporting competitiveness is improving growth. The real question, when 
exchange rate policy is concerned, is its real level that will maintain or improve 
the competitiveness of the economy.  It is essential to make a distinction between 
the current commercial exchange rate and the purchasing power parity rate. The 
current commercial exchange rate is usually lower than the purchasing power 
parity rate for developed countries, while in developing and transition countries 
the current commercial equilibrium exchange rate is higher than the purchasing 
power parity rate.
It is characteristic of developed countries that their currencies have a long-term 
mild appreciation tendency i.e. the difference between the purchasing power parity 
rate and the current commercial exchange rate is small. In the CEFTA countries the 
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approximation of the exchange rates is forecast for a period of over fi ve years, star-
ting from today. Croatia has already completed this process of approximation. 
At the beginning of the process the distance index of the current exchange 
rate and the purchasing power parity rate in transition countries was as much as 4 
to 6 times, while at the moment it is still 1.5 to 3 times.
The appreciation of the kuna after 1992 reduced the export competitiveness 
of the Croatian economy and increased the inclination towards import expansion 
and the substitution of domestic production with import products. With the possible 
joining of the Central European Free Trade Area, the Croatian economy would be 
exposed to strong competition from the economies of those countries because the 
data on the prices level demonstrate that those are  “cheaper” countries, that is they 
have a larger distance between the actual currency exchange rate and long-term 
real equilibrium exchange rate55. 
Thus, in Croatian development strategy, the aim of the exchange rate policy 
should be to improve the competitiveness of the domestic exporters on the world 
market by means of a real depreciation, with the purpose of eventually achieving the 
current balance-of-payments equilibrium. The depreciation policy also directs the 
demand towards domestic goods and so stimulates the growth of domestic producti-
on (“expenditure switching policy”). Finally, a general production increase occurs. 
However, the effi ciency of depreciation (devaluation) depends on a consistent credit 
policy, budget defi cit policy and wage policy. Over the medium-term other basic 
economic factors which determine the real exchange rate are connected with this. 
Such factors are the terms of trade, technological advances, tariff and non-tariff 
protection, one-way transfers, personal incomes and the purchasing power of the 
population based on one-way transfers 
Under current Croatian circumstances, as has been elaborated earlier, the 
economic policy has so far been oriented towards maintaining price stability by 
monetary and credit restrictions in order to stabilize the nominal exchange rate 
on a practically fi xed level against the DEM. Still, a question of starting the de-
velopment cycle remains, while the real domestic currency appreciation prompts 
the problem of the production and institutional restructuring of whole branches of 
the economy. 
It should be concluded that the exchange rate stability is a desirable aim of 
any development strategy. The problem, however, is what is the level the real 
exchange rate is set on. 
(e) Foreign trade system liberalization and exchange rate policy. The appre-
ciated exchange rate of the kuna is the main reason for the tendency of increasing 
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imports and the substantial export lag of the Croatian economy, that have been very 
persistent. Exposed to external competition because of the appreciated kuna and 
long-term savings shortage as well as the modest long-term foreign capital entry, the 
economy is unable to lower the costs through technological advance over the short 
and medium-term and thus improve competitiveness on the domestic and foreign 
markets. This is also connected with the protection system that could be able to 
protect and improve the competitiveness of the economy on the domestic market 
in a certain period. The aim of the protection policy, as a part of economic policy, 
is limiting imports by means of various tariff and non-tariff protection measures 
in order to protect the economy from foreign competition. This policy, however, 
can “preserve” the domestic market for some producers and branches but it does 
not stimulate exports, and without export expansion there can be no recovery of 
the economy as a whole and no prosperity for the country. 
This is why the increase of the kuna real appreciation causes tensions, de-
pending on the economic sector, and increases the pressure for greater domestic 
production protection. This demonstrates that the exchange rate policy and the 
foreign trade policy should be linked into a consistent policy of stabilization and 
development of the Croatian economy.
By means of a tighter integration with regional trade systems, and with 
global trade systems (GATT, WTO), the exchange rate policy and especially the 
real depreciation policy become the basic instrument of the development strategy, 
particularly in small open economies. Only after reaching the appropriate level of 
development, the fi xed exchange rate policy gains importance in the development 
strategy, with the aim of further structural adjustment to the world market. In the 
fi rst stage of development according to the IMF and the World Bank, the aim is to 
include the country into the fi nancial system and market. This is a stage of libera-
lizing the capital account of the balance-of-payments. The problem of sequences 
arises in this stage.
Joining the CEFTA or the EU with the current renouncing monetary sove-
reignty of the country which causes the inability to infl uence the economic gro-
wth and the competitiveness of the economy by means of a monetary policy, the 
accumulated structural development problems, low global competitiveness and 
underemployment, would expose the Croatian economy to a high pressure of fo-
reign competition. Because of this, long-term economic development policy has to 
establish the preconditions for Croatia to join the economic and monetary union, in 
order to experience the positive effects of integration over the long-term.
The current Croatian system of the exchange rate that is actually tied (“peg-
ged”) to the DEM and its rigid monetary policy do not represent a sovereign mo-
netary system. Structural development problems caused by the disintegration of a 
wider market, the disruption of joint custom and monetary zones, excessive fear 
S. ZDUNIĆ: Croatian Stabilization and Development Policy in the 1990s
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (3-4) 256-301 (2004) 295
from infl ation and relatively abundant foreign convertible money and a supply 
of short-term (speculative) capital have created a vague situation which prevents 
the use of the already available fi nancial and production capacities of the country. 
Undefi ned monetary transmission mechanisms produce developmentally unacce-
ptable indicators of interest rates, exchange rate and production factor prices. The 
productivity of the country is generally too low to be able to support the highly 
appreciated real exchange rates.
The Basic Issues Of The Stabilization, Restructuring 
And Development Policy - Conclusion
Based on the analysis of the role and the purpose of the activities of the 
Bretton – Woods institutions in developing and transition countries and in Croatia, 
important questions arise:
• how has the Croatian development strategy defi ned its own development 
goals; which social and national priorities does it include;
• how has the Croatian development strategy interpreted the role of the ar-
rangement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 
terms of the expected economic and social priorities in terms of recovery 
and full employment of the economic and fi nancial capacities of the country; 
whether the arrangements themselves have been understood as a complete 
development strategy, or they have been interpreted only as a stage of 
economic stabilization in order to overcome structural imbalances caused 
by the disintegration of socialism, the former federal state and the war;
• whether the Croatian economic strategy has, under the infl uence of Bretton-
Woods institutions, been reduced to the aims of globalization and regional 
integration of the Croatian economy regardless of  its “social costs” during 
that process in the current medium-term period with long-term implicati-
ons;
• to what extent is it possible to create and implement a sovereign develop-
ment strategy of a small country in the described circumstances.
If it is possible to outline a national development strategy during the current 
“neoliberal doctrine” domination, for the implementation of which, in its “eclectic” 
form, the Bretton-Woods institutions were engaged, then the questions of the Cro-
atian economic strategy, based on the results of this analysis, could be expressed 
in the following way:
1. The strategy of accelerating economic recovery is opposed to (it is in 
confl ict) with the strategy of underemployment equilibrium implying de-
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fl ationary stabilization; the solution of that confl ict is creating a strategy in 
stages i.e. a kind of sequencing strategy;
2. Defl ation contradicts recovery, growth and development criteria and induces 
production restructuring in the underemployment stage with unfavourable 
structural consequences;
• The solution could be aggregate demand expansion through credit ex-
pansion within the limits of fi scal discipline, and with ceilings of the net 
external assets of the banking system and liquid money in a broad sense 
(M4); the aggregate demand expansion should be implemented with 
appropriate wage control; lower real interest rates and depreciation are 
an implication of credit expansion, which stimulates development and 
employment; it means that it is possible to resolve the confl ict between 
the anti-infl ationary policy and the growth policy by the rules of fi scal 
discipline, monetary expansion control and restriction and with the wage 
policy; in Croatian circumstances, the room for such a policy is still 
unused.
3. Insuffi cient presence on the international fi nancial market, especially in the 
area of direct investments, the stabilization policy still produces too high 
real interest rates and the appreciation of the kuna and induces production 
restructuring too early in a state of high underemployment;
• The solution could be a stage approach to development strategy: in 
the fi rst stage higher monetary sovereignty, and an export stimulating 
exchange rate; by means of an exchange rate policy and developmen-
tally acceptable interest rates, consumption would in the beginning be 
restricted and then redirected towards domestic products; in that way 
export competitiveness would be supported by relative prices rules in 
accordance with the global productivity of the economy; a development-
oriented arrangement with the IMF is required, if it is really necessary; 
a development programme of an exclusively microeconomic orientation 
stipulated by the World Bank doctrine is not complete, and in certain 
segments it is one-sided and premature for the development moment of 
the Croatian economy; in the stage of stability when short-term and long-
term capital is prone to infl ow into the country is a sign of beginning a 
mature stage of recovery; in that stage the market mechanism will regulate 
development-stimulating interest rate; this stage presumes a developed 
institutional infrastructure and developed mechanisms of the country’s 
fi nancial system.
4. The kuna appreciation policy i.e. the policy of stability on a misaligned 
level, that is in the state of underemployment equilibrium, contradicts the 
industrialization of the country and implements an excessive tertiarization 
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of the economic structure, which endangers the future external equilibrium, 
but also the optimal economic and employment structure:
• Regional integration processes will put Croatian industry into an econo-
mic environment similar to that from the late 19th century; however, the 
competitiveness of the environment will be much higher: the currency 
exchange rate, the cost of labour and interest rates will become of high 
importance; at the present moment, Croatian industry is evidently un-
competitive on this market; this is of special importance for “small and 
medium-sized enterprises” which will be under the pressure of market 
expansion; much of Croatian industry traditionally belongs to this ca-
tegory of companies and enterprises; the problem of big-scale industry 
in Croatia will particularly depend on specifi c government incentives; 
similar to Eastern-Asian countries; the question arises whether it is not 
too late for creating such an industrial policy; 
• The resolution is to put a foreign exchange system (fi xed, fl oating, fi xed-
but-adjustable) that would be consistent with the basic economic funda-
mentals i.e. foreign trade system liberalization coordinated with capital 
account liberalization; a stage approach is necessary to be implemented 
as a part of the recovery policy, industrial policy and structural policy in 
the circumstances of European integration processes; consistency of the 
real equilibrium exchange rate policy and protection and liberalization 
of the foreign trade system is necessary and required.
5. Premature foreign trade system liberalization and the appreciation of the 
kuna have structural consequences that contradict the aims of the full em-
ployment policy i.e. the underemployment overcoming strategy;
• The solution for these issues could be a stage development strategy ap-
proach on the aggregate level, as well as on the level of sectors, branches 
and groups of the economy; the importance of the exchange rate increases 
with the level of foreign trade system liberalization. 
6. From these theories it can be concluded that the monetary policy, especially 
the exchange rate and fi scal policies, in its macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic aspects, should be coordinated with the recovery and development 
policy and with the policy of stabilization and banking and foreign trade 
system liberalization.
7. At the end, it is useful to state L. Taylor’s opinion concerning the infl uence 
that the Bretton-Woods institutions have on national development strategi-
es56
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• “First, there should be less conditionality in terms of micro and macro 
management and price formation by means of their “policy matrix”; 
the conditionality could be reversed so that the countries present their 
economic programmes to the two institutions, instead of the present re-
versed situation; the volume of conditionality could be limited to only, 
for example, balance-of-payments aims while the countries should follow 
their own path when infl ation, national income distribution and growth 
are concerned.
• Second, the Bretton-Woods institutions could redirect their resources 
towards their original role, which means support for the countries with 
external account problems.
• Third, in the past few decades the two institutions have deserved credit 
for making the countries aware of the danger of fi scal indiscipline and of 
the benefi ts of avoiding balance-of-payments restrictions through export 
support. They have become aware how growth can be hindered due to the 
distortion of prices, such as terms of trade for agriculture, as well as real 
currency exchange rate and interest rates distortions. On the micro level, 
the two institutions have helped by their support for company reforms. 
It is said that the Bretton-Woods institutions learn from their mistakes. 
This is the basic contradiction – the Institutions react to the mi
• stakes but they do not cover the expenses”.
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POLITIKA STABILIZACIJE I RAZVOJA U HRVATSKOJ 90-ih
Sažetak
Studija analizira svrhu i različite oblike programskih aranžmana s međunarodnim 
fi nancijskim institucijama. Obrađuju se načela i značenje opće primjenjivih fi nancijskih 
programa, a naročito uloga MMF-a i Svjetske banke u uspostavljanju hrvatske ekonom-
ske politike. Konačni rezultat studije je pregled ocjene aktualnog stanja i budućih izgleda 
hrvatske ekonomije, kao dugoročnih implikacija politike strukturnog prilagođavanja koju 
je odredila nacionalna vlada u koordinaciji s MMF-om i Svjetskom bankom.
Moguće je iznijeti nacionalnu strategiju razvoja koja se temelji na rezultatima ove 
analize:
Strategija može biti fazni pristup razvoju: u prvoj fazi potrebni su viši monetarni 
suverenitet i tečaj stimuliran izvozom; pomoću tečajne politike i razvojno prihvatljivim 
kamatnim stopama potrošnja će u početku biti ograničena a zatim preusmjerena prema 
domaćim proizvodima; na taj način izvoznu konkurentnost će poduprijeti pravila relativnih 
cijena u skladu s globalnom produktivnošću ekonomije; razvojni program jedne isključivo 
mikroekonomske orijentacije koju je odredila doktrina Svjetske banke nije završen, i u izvje-
snim segmentima je jednostran i preuranjen za razvojni trenutak hrvatske ekonomije; faza 
stabilnosti kada kratkoročni i dugoročni kapital pritječu u zemlju će biti znak početka zrele 
faze oporavka i razvoja; u ovoj fazi će tržišni mehanizam regulirati razvojem stimuliranu 
kamatnu stopu; ova faza pretpostavlja razvijenu institucionalnu infrastrukturu i razvijene 
mehanizme fi nancijskog sustava zemlje. 
Politika aprecijacije kune t.j. politika stabilnosti na iskrivljenoj razini kune u fazi 
ravnoteže nedovoljne zaposlenosti, osporava industrijalizaciju zemlje i uključuje terci-
jarizaciju ekonomske strukture, što ugrožava buduću vanjsku ravnotežu, kao i optimalnu 
ekonomsku i strukturu zapošljavanja.
Iz ovih teorija se može zaključiti da monetarna politika, naročito politika tečaja i 
fi skalna politika, u svojim makroekonomskim i mikroekonomskim aspektima, moraju biti 
koordinirane s oporavkom i razvojnom politikom, politikom stabilizacije te liberalizacijom 
bankarskog i vanjskotrgovinskog sustava. 
Ključne riječi: stabilizacijska politika, restrukturiranje, defi cit tekućeg računa platne 
bilance, devizni tečaj, fi nancijski program, neto domaća aktiva HNB i bankovni sustav, 
aprecijacija, deprecijacija, konkurentnost gospodarstva, gospodarski oporavak i rast
